Spiritual Forum

Energy and hybrid war
in the Ukraine crisis

By Michael Ruhle and Julijus Grubliauskas 

The Russia-Ukraine crisis contains important energy lessons: When it comes to energy, geography is still destiny - and pipelines still equal economic and political power. The Ukraine crisis is also a reminder that energy security can be an issue of national security, and that dependence on Russia can be a strategic liability. 

But there is more. Energy can also be a part of "hybrid warfare". In order to orchestrate the illegal annexation of Crimea and de-stabilize eastern Ukraine, Russia demonstrated as much: In addition to the appearance of masked unmarked soldiers ("little green men") regular Russian soldiers "vacationing" in Ukraine, and a propaganda campaign reminiscent of the deepest Cold War, energy emerged as yet another instrument in Moscow's toolbox. 

Russia nationalized Ukrainian energy assets, abused Ukraine's energy dependence, and sought to deter other European states from supporting Ukraine. If this kind of "non-linear" warfare should indeed herald the future of conflict, understanding it becomes a matter of national survival. 

Annexing Crimean gas fields
Before Russia's annexation, Crimea received almost all of its energy from mainland Ukraine. In order to establish effective political control of the region, Russia "nationalized" the Ukrainian company operating in Crimea together with all its energy assets, including those offshore. Since these offshore gas installations extend from the Crimean coast all the way to the maritime border with Romania, their nationalization by Russia also significantly extended that country's geographical dominance in the Black Sea. 

Hence, in addition to previously Ukraine-owned energy infrastructure, estimated to be worth around US$1.2 billion, and over two billion cubic meters of natural gas storage in Crimea, Russia has acquired a massively extended maritime zone with a claim to underwater resources potentially worth trillions of dollars. For Ukraine, losing the opportunity to exploit what may amount to the best deep oil and gas reserves in the Black Sea is a massive setback for the country's economic prospects and its hopes of achieving energy independence. 

Energy cut-offs and gas supply reductions
Ukraine's dependence on Russian gas imports has long made energy a tempting tool for Russia to exert pressure. The Ukraine crisis brought this pressure to a new level. Since the annexation of Crimea also included the important Sevastopol naval base, Moscow no longer felt obliged to pay the rent: the gas price discount and the annual payments of over $600 million for the base and the right to use Ukrainian waters were rescinded. As a result, Ukraine was faced with a loss of revenues coupled with increased energy costs. 

When Ukraine refused to pay the increased gas price, Russia turned off the tab. Even with regard to coal, Russia had the upper hand: since the fighting in eastern Ukraine affected the coal mines and railroad lines, western Ukraine was deprived of coal and could barely maintain its electricity generation. 

Moscow also sought to deter others from supporting Ukraine. Several countries in Central and Eastern Europe were warned not to allow the "reverse flow" of Russian gas to Ukraine. The reduced pressure in certain pipelines, which led to a reduction of supplies, was also widely understood as a warning to some of Russia's customers not to interfere with Moscow's Ukraine policy. 

The West shooting itself in the foot
From the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, Moscow undertook a tremendous public relations effort to promulgate its own version of ongoing events. Many stories carried by Russian media outlets were far too outrageous to be convincing, yet Moscow's narrative regarding energy stood on firmer ground. 

This narrative implied that, given Russia's indispensable role as an energy supplier for Europe, the European countries, which were pushed by the United States into supporting Ukraine, were acting against their own long-term interests, since they risked ruining their energy partnership with Russia. 

While Russia took great care not to undermine its image as a reliable supplier vis-a-vis some European customers, the message of the West shooting itself in the foot by helping Ukraine came across: many European observers repeated it, thus reinforcing its credibility. 

Finally, Russia also used its gas deal with China to send a message to its traditional Western customers: while Europe remained dependent on Russian gas, Russia herself would soon have an energy partnership with Asia as a viable alternative to its energy trade with Europe. 

Conclusion: The fog of (hybrid) war
In sum, the Russia-Ukraine Ukraine crisis demonstrated the effectiveness of hybrid war, including its energy dimension. It also demonstrated a fundamental asymmetry: As a single state and "managed democracy" (Russian President Vladimir Putin) Russia controls the whole array of tools (economic, military, strategic communications) to achieve its goals. By contrast, the West has to negotiate a common position among many states and among different institutions. 

This asymmetry will always work to the initial advantage of the offender. Whether it will also work in the longer run, however, is less clear. In the end, the West was neither deterred from assisting Ukraine nor from imposing sanctions on Russia. 

Moreover, the low oil price has emerged as a major challenge for Russia's economy, and the crisis has given Europe new incentives to diversify its energy sources. In short, while hybrid war can achieve a lot, it cannot overcome what Clausewitz labeled "the fog of war": after the first move has been made, events tend to evolve in unforeseen ways. 

Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blendsconventional warfare, irregular warfare andcyberwarfare.^[1] In addition, hybrid warfare is used to describe attacks by nuclear, biological andchemical weapons, improvised explosive devicesand information warfare.^[2] This approach toconflicts, is a potent, complex variation ofwarfare.^[3] By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution.^[4] Hybrid warfare can be used to describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battlespace requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response.